This two-part paper addresses the design of retail electricity tariffs for distribution systems with distributed energy resources such as solar power and storage. In particular, the optimal design of dynamic two-part tariffs for a regulated monopolistic retailer is considered, where the retailer faces exogenous wholesale electricity prices and fixed costs on the one hand and stochastic demands with intertemporal price dependencies on the other. Part I presents a general framework and analysis for revenue adequate retail tariffs with advanced notification, dynamic prices, and uniform connection charges. It is shown that the optimal two-part tariff consists of a dynamic price that may not match the expected wholesale price and a connection charge that distributes uniformly among all customers the retailer's fixed costs and a price-volume risk premium. A sufficient condition for the optimality of the derived two-part tariff among the class of arbitrary ex-ante tariffs is obtained. Numerical simulations quantify the substantial welfare gains that the optimal two-part tariff may bring compared to the optimal linear tariff (without connection charge). Part II focuses on the impact of two-part tariffs on the integration of distributed energy resources.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE electric power industry is experiencing an important transformation driven by disruptive innovation in distributed renewable generation and energy storage systems [1] . A concern of this transformation is the impact of the inclining adoption of said distributed energy resources (DERs) on the financial viability of regulated distribution grid operators [2] . In particular, under the restriction to volumetric and net-metering tariffs, the gradual decline in energy sales could compromise the ability of grid operators to recover their predominantly fixed operational and capital expenditures. This could result in the need to increase retail prices further above wholesale electricity prices, thereby amplifying the entailed economic inefficiencies, inter-customer cross-subsidies, and incentives for DER adoption in a vicious circle. Manuscript This two-part paper aims to shed lights on the effectiveness of connection charges as a means to mitigate the negative impacts of the sustained adoption of DERs. To this end, part I develops a framework to analyze the efficiency of retail electricity tariffs set for a regulated retailer who serves a heterogeneous population of residential customers under demand and wholesale price uncertainties.
In particular, we are interested in two practical and fairly general ex-ante retail pricing models: a volumetric linear tariff and a two-part tariff consisting of a volumetric linear charge and a connection charge. Our goal in part I is to gain insights into the structure of the optimal revenue adequate linear and two-part tariffs that allow us to analyze, in part II [3] , the effects of integrating customer and retailer-owned DERs.
A. Related Work
There is a vast literature on efficient retail pricing of electricity, the economic foundations of which reside in the classical theory of peak-load pricing [4] -known more recently as dynamic pricing [5] . Recent reviews of the subject along with a brief history of its adoption by regulators and electric utilities can be found in [6] , [7] . In this context, connection charges have been considered as a means to raise additional revenue to recover the predominantly fixed costs of electric utilities [4] , [8] . In the U.S., mild connection charges are prevalent with exceptions such as California, where the large investor-owned utilities have default volumetric residential tariffs with virtually no connection charges 1 [9] .
In the last two decades, while the adoption of time-varying prices has been particularly slow in the U.S. [5] , the advent of cheaper smart meters, small-scale renewable energy installations, battery storage technologies and home energy management tools has stimulated research in dynamic pricing (see [10] , [11] and references therein) as sophisticated technologies can enable customers to react to price signals [12] . Of particular interest is real-time pricing (RTP), a form of dynamic pricing widely known to be a critical feature of efficient electricity markets [13] . An overview of dynamic pricing and a recent analysis of its limited adoption in the U.S. are available in [13] and [5] , respectively.
Economic approaches to dynamic pricing often rely on functional demand models to characterize competitive equilib-rium prices when smart meters become available to customers [14] - [16] . The most relevant analysis is [16] where the socially optimal linear and two-part retail tariffs subject to a retailer revenue sufficiency constraint are derived. Unlike our work, however, this analysis does not accommodate inter-temporal demand dependencies nor the integration of DERs.
Most engineering approaches to dynamic pricing, on the other hand, focus on analyzing demand response models in smart grids [10] , [11] . These approaches often involve modeling customer behavior [17] , [18] , sometimes down to the appliance level [19] - [22] , by characterizing customers' response to certain pricing scheme. Appliances modeled include thermostatically controlled loads (TCL) [21] , [22] , electric vehicles [20] , and batteries [19] . Other works focus on designing said pricing schemes to induce a desired behavior anticipating customers' response [23] - [28] . For example, the work in [23] considers utility-maximizing consumers and a social-welfare-maximizing supplier that procures electricity in two steps (day-ahead and in real-time). In a multiperiod and deterministic setting, the authors derive the socially optimal retail prices: a time-differentiated linear tariff. In a similar setting where only the real-time market and a stylized TCL model are considered, the work in [28] derives optimal day-ahead retail prices while accommodating cost and demand uncertainty and an implicit retailer revenue requirement. 2 There is also a rich theoretical literature on the efficiency and equity of two-part tariffs. A key challenge in markets with large fixed costs, such as electricity and gas, is a trade-off between efficiency and equity. Among utilities, setting retail prices equal to marginal costs -which generally favors economic efficiencydoes not yield enough revenue to cover administrative and capital costs (i.e., fixed costs). In this context, linear tariffs are purely volumetric tariffs that multiple a price signal with total consumption to compute the total bill of a customer. Two-part tariffs, on the other hand, are a form of nonlinear tariff that essentially consist of a volumetric charge and a fixed connection charge. Nonlinear tariffs emerged as a more flexible tool to recover fixed costs while mitigating efficiency losses and better managing equity concerns [8] , [29] . Two-part and other nonlinear tariffs have been widely studied in the context of utilities (e.g., [4] , [29] - [32] ). Their application to monopoly pricing was studied in Oi's seminal work [31] . In practice, nonlinear tariffs are prevalent in U.S. electricity and gas utilities [8] . Most residential customers, which represented 87% of all electricity customers in the U.S. in 2015, 3 face a connection charge [8] , [9] .
A related form of linear pricing essentially aimed at recovering fixed costs while minimizing efficiency losses is known in economics as Ramsey pricing [33] . Our work is along the lines of [16] , which leverages the concept of Ramsey pricing to set an electricity tariff design problem and interpret the optimal tariffs therein derived. The central result in Ramsey pricing is that differentiated pricing should be based on demand elasticity. The classical theory suggests that "groups of consumers with very inelastic demand should pay higher markups over marginal cost than groups of consumers with very elastic demand" [8] . Such application of the theory, however, raises inter-customer equity concerns [8] . Moving away from such inter-customer tariff design issues, our work applies Ramsey-like differentiated pricing across time periods (e.g., hours) rather than across groups of consumers.
B. Summary of Results and Contributions
The main contribution of part I is the explicit characterization of the optimal revenue adequate ex-ante two-part tariff for a stochastic demand with inter-temporal dependencies. The results in part I lay the foundation for analyzing the welfare impacts of integrating DERs such as solar power and energy storage under different retail tariffs, which we address in part II. Here we apply the classical Ramsey pricing theory with extensions to accommodate the uncertainty and inter-temporal dependencies of demand that arise with the integration of behind-the-meter renewables and storage. While economic literature has disregarded said extensions, engineering approaches to dynamic pricing and demand response have ignored the revenue adequacy objective of retail tariff design, which our work addresses explicitly. In this context, there are no existing comparable studies in the open literature with the exception of a preliminary work in [34] . To a large extent, our results are an examination of emerging issues in smart distribution systems through the lens of classical economic results on the fundamental efficiency of two-part tariffs in stylized economic models [4] . The scope of our work focuses on basic tariff design issues emerging from the widespread adoption of DERs in distribution networks. More specific issues related to the locational value and compensation of DERs is out of the scope of our paper.
The main results of this paper are as follows. We consider the design of ex-ante retail tariffs from the perspective of a regulated retailer subject to a revenue sufficiency constraint. The ex-ante tariffs considered here include traditional tariffs with long lag times as well as some of the more sophisticated tariffs that are being considered for smart distribution systems. Examples include time-of-use tariffs, critical peak pricing, variable peak pricing, and real-time pricing [12] . The retailer considered in this paper is a regulated monopoly which, on one hand, serves heterogeneous residential customers with elastic demands. The demand model considered here is stochastic and captures intertemporal price dependencies. On the other hand, the retailer interfaces with an exogenous wholesale market with stochastic real-time prices. We describe the models in our formulation in Section II.
Within this general setting, we characterize the structure of optimal linear and two-part tariffs in the presence of demand and wholesale price uncertainty in Section III. In particular, we show that the optimal ex-ante two-part tariff consists of a time-varying retail price that not always matches the expected wholesale price and a connection charge that allocates uniformly among all customers the retailer's fixed costs and risk-related costs caused by the ex-ante determination of the tariff. We further show that the optimal volumetric tariff, referred hereafter as linear tariff, is characterized by a time-varying price markup-relative to the optimal two-part tariff's price-that depends on the retailer's fixed costs and the price elasticity of demand.
We further compare the efficiency of the linear and two-part tariff in Section III-C. Specifically, we present a parametric characterization of the social welfare or total surplus and the consumer surplus as a function of the retailer's fixed costs. We show that the two-part tariff achieves the same social welfare regardless of the retailer's fixed costs. For the linear tariff, in contrast, the social welfare decreases as the fixed costs increase, thus characterizing a trade-off between fixed costs and efficiency. We also provide a sufficiency condition under which the two-part tariff is optimal among all ex-ante nonlinear tariffs.
We demonstrate the performance of the derived tariffs numerically using publicly available data from NYISO and the largest utility company in New York City in Section IV. Contingent on the deployment of enabling technologies and smart meters, our results estimate that the optimal day-ahead linear tariff could bring loses (4.8% of the utility's revenue) relative to the utility's suboptimal two-part flat tariff due to the lack of a connection charge. The optimal day-ahead two-part tariff, on the other hand, could bring significant gains (8.1% of the utility's revenue). From a societal perspective, these loses and gains manifest themselves as reductions and increments in electricity consumption, respectively. These estimates assume a realistic own-price elasticity of demand and a stylized model for TCL. Concluding remarks and proof sketches of the main results are included in Section V and the Appendix, respectively. Detailed proofs of all results can be found in [35] .
C. Notations
We use x = E[x] to denote the expectation of a random vector x ∈ R n and Σ x,y = Cov(x, y) ∈ R n ×m to denote the crosscovariance matrix of two random vectors x ∈ R n , y ∈ R m . Let also x k denote the kth entry of a vector x ∈ R n and x its transpose.
II. MODEL
Given our focus on the retail electricity market, we assume the state of the wholesale market is represented by an exogenous discrete-time random process λ k ∈ R + , which represents the wholesale RTP of electricity at time k in a single location of interest. We assume that the time periods k = 1, . . . , N partition a billing cycle, which is the time horizon relevant for our formulation. Moreover, we assume the wholesale RTP accurately reflects the social marginal cost of electricity [9] .
A. A Retail Tariff Model
In this paper, we consider time-differentiated retail electricity tariffs that are set and announced in advance (i.e., ex-ante) by a regulated retailer with a fixed lag time. These tariffs (i) are fixed before the beginning of a billing period of certain length (e.g., a month or a day) with a fixed lag time (e.g., several days or hours), (ii) specify a pricing rule that depends on the temporal consumption profile within the billing period rather than on the accumulated consumption, and (iii) are allowed to vary dynamically from one billing period to the next. In the context of retail tariffs, the tariff lag time induces a trade-off between advanced price notification and price signal accuracy [13] . The tariff model considered here captures both the traditional long term flat tariff that has months or years of lag time as well as more sophisticated dynamic tariffs such as those with days or hours of advanced notification, but it generally excludes ex-post tariffs such as those indexed to the wholesale RTP.
Formally, some time before the billing cycle starts, the retailer announces a tariff T : R N → R that maps the metered consumption power profile q ∈ R N of each customer to a scalar charge T (q) ∈ R. While the kth entry of q is a single customer's metered consumption in period k of the billing period, the amount T (q) (in dollars) represents the total bill. Note that this form of tariff captures the intertemporal dependencies of pricing and consumption within each billing cycle (but not between several billing cycles).
Given a tariff T , customers rationally choose in real-time how much electricity to purchase from the retailer during each consumption period of the current billing cycle. The retailer then pays for the aggregate demand at the wholesale RTP.
Although in practice retailers buy certain portions of the aggregate demand in forward markets (including the day-ahead market), we can neglect such purchases in our formulation without loss of generality for the following reason. In perfectly competitive and well-functioning two-settlement markets, forward transactions are essentially used to hedge against the volatility of the RTP. Here, we consider risk-neutral decision markers that deal with uncertainty by taking expectations. Thus, in our setting, forward markets would bring no significant advantages to any stakeholder. This justifies the reliance of the retailer in the RTP to purchase electricity, which is an assumption that simplifies our exposition considerably.
B. Consumer Model
We consider M customers (indexed by i) who obtain a monetary benefit (i.e., gross surplus) S i (q i , ω i ) ∈ R from consuming a power profile q i ∈ R N throughout the billing cycle. This benefit is contingent on
is an exogenous random process that represents customer i's local state. We assume that S i is continuously differentiable in (q i , ω i ). Accordingly, customer i exhibits a consumption profile q i = q i (T, ω i ) when facing a tariff T and a sequence of local states
Customers are rational in that sense that the sequence of consumptions {q i k (T, (ω 1 , . . . , ω k ))} N k =1 solves the multistage stochastic program
where the expectation is taken over ω i , and cs i (T ) represents customer i's expected surplus. Correspondingly, a tariff T yields an (aggregate) expected consumer surplus
where the expectation is taken over ω = (ω 1 , . . . , ω M ).
Of particular interest is the demand response to tariffs T with constant gradient ∇T = π ∈ R N , where π ∈ R N is a timevarying per-unit price, such as the tariff with the affine form T (q i ) = A + π q i . For such tariffs T we use the notation
for customer i's demand profile, thus implicitly assuming that it depends on T only through π. Hence, D i is a standard demand function which we assume to be nonnegative and continuously differentiable in π, and its Jacobian ∇ π D i ∈ R N ×N , with (k, t) entry ∂D i k /∂π t , negative definite. Under the regularity assumptions made on S i and D i , one can show that cs i (T ) is decreasing and convex in π (see Prop. 3 in Appendix). We further define the aggregate demand function as D(π, ω) := M i=1 D i (π, ω i ). A consumer model similar to the one decribed in this section for N = 1 is proposed and discussed with more detail in [16] .
For example, for a linear tariff T (q i ) = π q i , the consumption of a TCL may be modeled with a linear demand function D i (π, ω i ) = ω i − G i π, with deterministic and positive definite G i ∈ R N ×N . Such demand function can be derived from an additive and temporally-separable quadratic benefit function S i via stochastic dynamic programming [28] .
C. Retailer Model
We consider the case of a retail monopoly and refer to the single entity as the retailer, utility, or load-serving entity (LSE). In procuring an aggregate demand profile q = M i=1 q i ∈ R N , we assume that the retailer incurs a variable cost λ q, where λ = (λ 1 , . . . , λ N ) ∈ R N is the wholesale RTP 4 Hence, a tariff T yields the expected retailer surplus 5
where the expectation is taken over the global state ξ = (λ, ω).
For notational convenience, we define the retailer surplus collected from the volumetric charge π of an affine tariff T (q) = A + π q as φ(π) = (π − λ) D(π, ω) so that rs(T ) = φ(π) + MA and
Notably, the expression for the retailer surplus above captures its dependence on the price-load cross-covariance. We specifically model the stochastic dependency between electricity wholesale prices and load because this correlation embodies an outstanding risk-hedging challenge for electricity retailers [36] - [38] . Traditionally, the positive price-load correlation stems from the way inelastic loads causally drive price formation in wholesale markets. For example, on hotter-than-expected summer days, the demand and the wholesale prices both tend to exceed their day-ahead forecasts.
III. RETAIL TARIFF DESIGN
In our retail tariff design framework, we assume that the regulator mandates the retailer to choose a tariff T that maximizes the expected consumer surplus. Moreover, in order to recover the upstream fixed costs incurred to deliver electricity, the tariff should satisfy the revenue adequacy constraint rs(T ) = F , where F is a target approved by the regulator.
Formally, the regulator's problem can be stated as
In general, this problem falls in the category of Ramsey-Boiteux pricing and peak-load pricing in economics [39] , which are main components of the theory of public utility pricing [4, Sec. 4.5] . See [7] for a recent overview of this problem in the context of electricity pricing. The Ramsey-Boiteux pricing problem can take equivalent forms that may provide additional insight.
In an alternative, dual formulation explored in [28] and [16] , 6 the retailer maximizes its profit rs(T ) subject to the consumers being granted a certain level of surplus cs(T ).
In this section, we study linear and two-part tariffs-two of the most widely used tariffs in the electricity industry. The restriction to two-part tariffs can, in fact, be made without loss of generality under certain conditions (Theorem 3). We begin by making the following assumption that guarantees the existence and uniqueness of solutions to problem (6) .
is such that the Jacobian matrix ∇g(π) is negative definite (nd).
This assumption, made primarily for analytical convenience, is common in economics [16] . It imposes a limitation on the curvature of the demand function. 7 Intuitively, the demand can be linear, concave, or convex in π; however, when convex, restrictions on the "amount" of convexity are required for Assumption 1 to hold.
A. Structure of Optimal Two-Part Tariff
By restricting the regulator's problem to two-part tariffs of the form T (q) = A + π q, problem (6) can be reformulated as a convex program under Assumption 1. We emphasize here that our analysis implicitly assumes that no customer chooses to avoid the connection charge by not consuming electricity at all. 8 The following result characterizes the optimal solution. 6 See Theorem 1 and Section 2 (page 803), respectively. 7 In particular, for a linear demand
Concave demand functions are common in economic models since they guarantee profit and welfare maximization problems to be well defined [40] . See, for example, Prop. 4 in the Appendix. 8 This assumption is widely accepted for services such as electricity and water since "it is extremely unlikely that a customer will drop out of the market, however high the tariff" [4, Sec. 4.5]. Studies suggest, however, that more cost-effective DERs might challenge this assumption in future years [2] . Theorem 1: (Optimal two-part tariff) The two-part tariff T * that solves problem (6) is characterized by
Theorem 1 implies that the optimal price π * is characterized by a period-specific price markup relative to the expected RTP, λ. Examination of (7) reveals that this markup is essentially determined by the cross-covariance between the price sensitivity of demand and the RTP 9 To gain intuition into (7) , consider a demand independent across time, 10 case in which
for each k = 1, . . . , N, where we use
to represent the (own or cross-time) price elasticity of demand at time k with respect to the price at time t. The latter result resembles the (second-best optimal) ex-ante two-part tariff derived in [16, Sec. 3] for the single period case (N = 1). 11 The expression (8) for the optimal connection charge A * also has an intuitive interpretation. The first term corresponds to a uniform contribution towards the retailer's target F . And, the second term corresponds to a uniform preallocation of the surplus that the retailer expects to collect from the volumetric charge π * , φ(π * ), which-as noticeable from (5)-may be positive or negative in general.
To gain additional insights into expressions (7)-(9), consider the special case embodied by the following corollary.
Corollary 1: If ∇ π D(π, ω) and λ are uncorrelated, then π * = λ and A * = 1 M F + Tr(Cov(λ, D(λ, ω))) . Corollary 1 indicates that T * has a very simple and appealing structure that resembles the result for the deterministic case where π * = λ and A * = F/M . While the sharper result relies on an additional assumption, it is valid for many situations. In general, the assumption in Corollary 1 is satisfied by demands whose sensitivity to prices (i.e., their price elasticity) may depend on the customers' set of appliances and idiosyncratic preferences but not on random exogenous factors affecting the wholesale prices, such as local weather. For example, it is certainly true for demands that are not much affected by consumers' local randomness, such as the charging of electric vehicles and typical household appliances. Even for loads from smart HVAC systems that are affected by temperature fluctuations, the assumption in Corollary 1 holds because the demand function takes the form D(π, ω) = ω + D(π) [28] . Clearly, the Jacobian of such demand function, ∇ π D(π), which characterizes its sensitivity to prices, is deterministic and thus uncorrelated to the wholesale prices λ.
As for the simpler structure of T * , it may not be surprising since the efficiency of marginal cost pricing (i.e., π * = λ) is a classical result for the deterministic case [4, Sec. 4.5] [16] . Intuitively, marginal cost pricing is efficient because it induces customers to increase consumption until the derived marginal benefit matches the marginal cost of procuring electricity.
The expression for A * in Corollary 1 also has an intuitive interpretation. While the first term remains unchanged from (8), the second term becomes a risk premium associated to the crosscorrelation that the demand and the RTP may exhibit. When such cross-correlation is positive (as usual in practice [36] ), the retailer is likely to face additional variable costs since the expected variable cost E[λ D(λ, ω)] is larger than the variable revenue λ E[D(λ, ω)]. Intuitively, this fee represents a uniform risk premium that customers pay to face a deterministic price rather than the volatile RTP. Presumably, the inter-customer cross-subsidies arising from the uniform allocation of this risk premium are negligible compared to the differences. However, the integration of behind-the-meter renewables could make these cross-subsidies worth adjusting, for example, through the use of discriminatory connection charges consistent with the cost-causation principle described in [41] . A discussion on cross-subsidies is held in part II [3] .
B. Structure of the Optimal Linear Tariff
A tariff of the form T (q i ) = π q i -a linear tariff-is an ex-ante two-part tariff with no connection charge. While such purely volumetric tariff may be simpler, it has two fundamental disadvantages. First, a closed form expression of the optimal linear tariff is not available under general assumptions. Second, such restriction introduces a fundamental trade-off between the retailer surplus target and the attainable social welfare. These drawbacks are noticeable in Theorem 2 and Corollary 3, respectively.
When restricted to linear tariffs, a unique solution to problem (6) can be obtained due to Assumption 1. We characterize the optimal solution in the following result.
Theorem 2: (Optimal linear tariff) Consider the regime where F is large, i.e., F ≥ φ(π * ). If feasible, the linear tariff T † that solves problem (6) is characterized by
or, equivalently, by
where γ, the Lagrange multiplier of (6), satisfies γ −1 γ ∈ [0, 1] and is such that rs(T † ) = F . In this regime of F , the problem is feasible if and only if F ≤ φ(π M ), where π M is the price that maximizes rs(T ) over π, which matches π † as γ → ∞.
In Theorem 2, expression (11) reveals that the structure of the optimal linear tariff is characterized by a period-specific price markup relative to the price of the optimal two-part tariff π * . The scalar γ −1 γ ∈ [0, 1], often called the Ramsey number, adjusts markups in all periods uniformly to the point where the expected retailer surplus matches the target F . A closer examination of (11) , which can be rewritten as (12) , shows that the own and cross price elasticities of demand determine altogether the markup for each period within the billing cycle.
To understand (12) , it is informative to consider the case where the demand is independent across time, namely, ε kt (·) = 0 for t = k. In this case, the product of the markup (π † k − π * k )/π † k and the own-price elasticity −ε kk (π * ) remains constant in time and equal to the Ramsey number. This means that periods with inelastic demands get high markups and periods with elastic demands get low markups. For this reason, this pricing rule is known in economics as the inverse elasticity rule [4, Sec. 3.3]. Even simpler is the single period case, also derived in [16, Sec. 3] . Notably, when N = 1, the scalar price π † can be obtained directly from the constraint rs(T † ) = F , and it must be set so that it pays for the average total cost of the procured electricity, i.e.,
A specialized application of this result was developed in [28] , where a model for TCLs under a day-ahead hourly pricing scheme was considered. In this case, the demand function for each consumer is linear and the surplus function is quadratic [28] . The aggregated demand is therefore also linear. The consumers as a collective have a quadratic aggregated surplus [28] . Specifically,
where G i ∈ R 24×24 is deterministic, positive definite (and symmetric). Letting G = M i=1 G i and Ω = M i=1 ω i and applying Theorem 2 readily yields
where π o = G −1 Ω induces E[D(π o , Ω)] = 0 and ρ = γ −1 γ is the Ramsey number, which is set so that rs(T † ) = F . Intuitively, ρ varies within [0, 1] inducing prices that vary between λ and the profit-maximizing price π M = 1 2 (π o + λ) as F varies between φ(λ) and the maximum profit φ(π M ).
C. Tariff Performance Comparison
We now discuss the performance of the derived tariffs in terms of social welfare (expected total surplus) leveraging the graphical representation provided in Fig. 1 . Therein, a Pareto front for each tariff illustrates the expected consumer surplus and social welfare induced by the tariff for different retailer surplus targets F ∈ [φ(π * ), φ(π M )]. On one hand, Theorem 1 has the following implication.
Corollary 2: As a tariff parametrized by F , the two-part tariff T * induces an expected total surplus sw * that is independent of F and cs(T * ) = sw * − F .
In Corollary 2, sw * denotes the constant SW attained by the price π * , where sw * = sw(T * ) = cs(T * ) + rs(T * ). Implicit in this result is that for any affine tariff one can check that
depends on π but not on A. Corollary 2 thus implies that under the tariff T * , collecting additional revenue from customers to cover larger fixed costs embedded in F reduces consumer welfare but does not compromise social welfare. This "iso-efficient" trade-off between retailer and consumer surplus is illustrated in Fig. 1 with a linear Pareto front with negative and unitary slope in the cs-rs plane. Intuitively, suboptimal two-part tariffs 12 can achieve any point in the cs-rs plane in the shaded area below the linear Pareto front in Fig. 1 , but no ex-ante two-part tariff can achieve points above this front. Theorem 2, on the other hand, has a analogous implication. Corollary 3: The quantities sw(T † ) and cs(T † ) induced by T † as a tariff parametrized by F are decreasing and concave in F ∈ [φ(π * ), φ(π M )] with sw(T † ) = sw * and cs(T † ) = sw * − F for F = φ(π * ). Corollary 3 reveals that, unlike the tariff T * , the optimal linear tariff T † compromises not only consumer welfare but also social welfare when collecting additional revenue from customers is required to cover larger fixed costs embedded in F . This tradeoff is depicted in Fig. 1 with a decreasing and concave Pareto front in the cs-rs plane that bends away from the efficiency level sw * attained by the tariff T * as F increases from φ(π * ) until it reaches φ(π M ). As before, suboptimal linear tariffs can achieve any point in the shaded area below the curved Pareto front in Fig. 1 , but no ex-ante linear tariff can achieve points above this front.
From the previous analysis, it is clear that two-part tariffs dominate linear tariffs in terms of expected consumer surplus in the regime of practical relevance where F ≥ φ(π * ). A natural question to ask is whether two-part tariffs can be dominated by more complex nonlinear ex-ante tariffs. To gain some insight into such a broad question, we examine a special case. In the following, we argue that under certain sufficient condition the two-part tariff T * is indeed optimal for the regulator's problem (6) among all ex-ante arbitrary tariffs. To establish such result it suffices to show that T * induces the same expected consumer surplus that would be achieved by a social planner who makes consumption decisions on behalf of customers with the unconstrained objective of maximizing the expected total surplus. This is because the social planner's problem provides a trivial upper bound to the regulator's problem.
Because we are interested in comparing ex-ante tariffs only, the social planner's problem should incorporate such implicit restriction. The restriction to ex-ante tariffs translates into a restriction for the social planner to use only the information observable by each customer i when choosing their consumption, namely their local state ω i . Hence, the social planner's problem can be stated as (17) where the expectation is taken with respect to ξ = (λ, ω), and q i (ω i ) is causally contingent on (i.e., adapted to) the local state ω i . Finally, under the assumption that each ω i and λ are independent, we show that the optimal solution to (17) is q i (ω i ) = D i (π * , ω i ), which matches the demand induced by the optimal two-part tariff. This result and the implied optimality of T * are summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 3: If (A2) the wholesale RTP λ and the local state ω i of each customer i = 1, . . . , M are statistically independent, then the two-part tariff T * is an optimal solution of (6) among all arbitrary tariffs with the same lag time.
Theorem 3 indicates that the regulator's restriction to twopart tariffs, which are among the simplest nonlinear tariffs, may imply no loss of social welfare. While seemingly useful for a regulator, this result relies on an assumption stronger than that in Corollary 1. Given its assumption, Theorem 3 applies to demands that are not affected by consumers' local randomness, such as washers and dryers, computers, and the charging of electric vehicles. Namely, demands that, given a retail price profile π, are independent from random exogenous factors affecting the wholesale prices λ. For all the other cases, where the sufficient condition (A2) does not hold, Theorem 3 sheds lights on the performance of the optimal ex-ante two-part tariff T * . While it is clear that the regulator's restriction to ex-ante tariffs entails some loss of social welfare when (A2) is not satisfied, 13 it is not clear whether the restriction to two-part tariffs generally entails social welfare losses. In other words, can one find a necessary condition (on the relationship between ω i and λ) implied by the optimality of T * for problem (6)?
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
We now estimate the performance of the optimal linear and two-part tariffs with day-ahead hourly prices in a practical setting. Using publicly available data from Con Edison (New York City's largest distribution utility) and NYISO for the Summer of 2015, we estimate the average daily gains in consumer surplus that both tariffs would have brought relative to the utility's default two-part tariff with flat rate. Here we assume a linear demand model (13)- (14) and day-ahead linear and two-part tariffs.
We first describe the methodology used to determine the parameters (Ω, G) characterizing Con Edison's hourly demand D(π, ω) = Ω − Gπ for an average summer day. The utility's monthly residential energy sales 14 and an estimated residential hourly load profile 15 are used to obtain the utility's aggregate electricity demand for 92 summer days with hourly resolution. We denote the resulting 24 dimensional vectors by {x j } 92 j =1 and use them as independent and identically distributed (iid) realizations of the utility's demand in an arbitrary summer day D(π CE , ω) ∈ R 24 , where π CE ∈ R 24 represents Con Edison's flat rate. As a flat rate, each hourly price is equal to a constant fixed in advanced on a monthly basis. In Con Edison's case, π CE k = r for k = 1, . . . , 24 with r = 17.2 cents/kWh. 16 First, to obtain G, we consider the expected energy consumed in a single day, E[D(π CE , ω)] 1, which we estimate asx 1, wherex is the sample average of {x j } 92 j =1 . By definition, at Con Edison's fixed rate r, the own-price elasticity of the total energy consumed in a single day can be written as
Hence, an estimator of ε(r) is given bŷ
Rather than estimating ε(r), we use this estimator to solve for the scalar 1 G1 by assuming a reasonable value for the elasticity ε(r), namely, 1 G1 = (x 1)ε(r)/r. The next step is to derive the entries of G ∈ R 24×24 using the single equation 1 G1 = constant. Given the simple structure of G derived in [28] , which is essentially characterized by a thermal parameter and a scaling parameter, all the entries of G can be readily obtained by assuming a reasonable thermal parameter 17 In this process, we assumed a value of ε(r) = −0.3, which is a reasonable estimate of the short-term own-price elasticity of electricity demand [42] . We also tested other elasticity values to understand the impact of this assumption. This sensitivity analysis over ε(r) is presented in [43] . Second, given G, one can readily obtain an estimate of the other demand parameter since Ω = E[D(π CE , ω)] + Gπ CE . Such estimate is given byΩ =x + Gπ CE . Finally, other assumptions and computations were required for our analysis. We assumed a total of M = 2.2 million of residential retail customers and used Con Edison's default residential connection charge, which amounts to A CE = 0.52 $ /day, to roughly estimate the utility's average daily revenue from residential customers as rev(T CE ) = E[D(1π CE , ω)] 1π CE + MA CE or $ 7.19 million USD. As for the wholesale prices λ ∈ R 24 , we used 92 days of day-ahead electricity prices for the New York City zone as iid realizations to estimate λ and the cross-covariance matrix Σ λ,ω with sample mean and covariance estimators.
We plot in Fig. 2 five Pareto fronts each induced by a type of two-part tariff and a range of values for the parameter F , which represents the retailer surplus requirement. For each type of tariff, we obtain its Pareto front by first deriving the tariff that satisfies the revenue sufficiency constraint rs(T ) = F for many values of F in certain interval. Given such tariffs, we then compute the induced (expected) consumer and retailer surpluses and plot them as points in the coordinate plane.
The five types of tariffs characterized by their Pareto fronts in Fig. 2 are described in Table I in the same vertical order, from top to bottom, as they appear in the figure and the legend. This set of tariff types is quite broad and roughly captures many tariffs used in practice. On one extreme, type #5 (in Table I ) is the simplest possible tariff since it is characterized by a single (scalar) parameter. On the other extreme, the optimal two-part tariff is the most complex tariff since it is characterized by N + 1 parameters, all of which are optimized to maximize the expected consumer surplus. Most tariffs used in the U.S. for residential customers fall somewhere in between these two types of tariffs, including Con Edison's flat tariff.
Notably, we only consider ex-ante tariffs as opposed to expost retail tariffs for several reasons. First, virtually all timevarying or dynamic retail tariffs in practice use ex-ante prices [5] , [14] . Second, while ex-post prices may have an appealing microeconomic justification, they entail several difficulties including the need to derive a valid rational consumer response model for ex-post prices. Third, ex-post prices entail several practical difficulties including, for example, the lack of studies estimating the price elasticity of demand in the short-term [42] or for ex-post prices.
It is worth highlighting that the tariff type #3 is the one used by Con Edison. Notably, for F = rs(T CE ), the Pareto front of this tariff passes by the point (cs(T CE ), rs(T CE )), which are the consumer and retailer surplus induced by Con Edison's tariff T CE . In Fig. 2 , we use such point as the origin (i.e., a benchmark) and plot the Pareto fronts relative to this point, thus making them represent relative gains or losses of surplus rather than absolute measures of surplus. Hence, one may describe each Pareto front with the parametric curve
where the range for the parameter F is defined precisely. Therein, Δcs(F ) and Δrs(F ) denote the surplus gains (losses if negative) relative to the corresponding surplus achieved by T CE . For instance, for the optimal two-part tariff Δcs(F ) = cs(T * ) − cs(T CE ). Moreover, in Fig. 2 , the normalized axes (i.e., lower horizontal and left vertical) are provided to give some perspective on the scale of the gains and losses. The gross revenue rev(T CE ) = $ 7.19 M induced by Con Edison's tariff is used as the normalizing reference. In other words, Figs. 2 and 3 compare the performance of different types of tariffs measured as the consumer surplus gain they induce given a retail surplus requirement F . These differences are more evident in Fig. 3 , which magnifies Fig. 2 around the origin, and in Table I , which presents a summary of results. At Con Edison's estimated surplus F = rs(T CE ), the figures show that Con Edison's tariff T CE , whose induced surpluses represent the origin in both figures, outperforms the two tariffs without connection charges. This is due to its nonzero connection charge A CE , which helps mitigating the inefficient need to markup retail prices to increase the retailer surplus up to F = rs(T CE ). In contrast, Con Edison's tariff T CE is outperformed by the other two tariffs, which have an equal or larger connection charge. Both such tariffs have time-varying or dynamic prices, thus making them economically more efficient than Con Edison's flat tariff. In particular, it is worth highlighting that switching from Con Edison's tariff T CE to the optimal linear tariff T † (type #4) that achieves the same retailer surplus F = rs(T CE ), would actually decrease consumers' expected surplus (−4.8% or− $ 345 k USD/day). This suggests that, by virtue of a connection charge, even a simple flat tariff can outperform a fairly sophisticated day-ahead hourly volumetric tariff. Moreover, by allowing Con Edison's tariff price profile to be time-varying, while holding fixed its connection charge (type #2), one would obtain an slight gain in consumer surplus (1% or $ 72 k USD/day). In contrast, switching to the optimal two-part tariff (type #1) would bring significant gains in consumer surplus (8.1% or $ 582 k USD/day). Recalling the common tradeoff between efficiency and equity, this optimal two-part tariff does raise an issue worth highlighting. Its connection charge of A * = $ 2.65/day or nearly $ 80/month induces bill reductions for customers with 6.62% more consumption than the average customer but bill increments for all other customers. Clearly, such charges may be politically unacceptable for low-income customers and may require cross-subsidized reduced tariffs, which have been an industry standard [4, Sec. 7.4].
The previous analysis corroborates the theory discussed in Section III-C and illustrated in Fig. 1 . Broadly, the results depicted in Fig. 2 and discussed above are evidence of how higher connection charges can collect certain amount of revenue more efficiently than higher price markups. These results quantify the potential short-term efficiency gains that could be obtained by reducing retail prices, letting them reflect more accurately marginal electricity costs, and by increasing fixed charges. It also quantifies the short-term efficiency losses that could be caused by reducing connection charges while increasing retail prices, which would further distort prices from their most efficient level. Interestingly, the numerical results also suggest that raising fixed charges increases short-term efficiency more significantly than dynamic pricing.
V. CONCLUSION
In this first part, we derive consumer-welfare-maximizing, revenue adequate, and ex-ante linear and two-part dynamic tariffs from the perspective of a regulated retailer. This initial analysis is for the case without renewables or storage in the distribution system. Our results generalize previous works by deriving said tariffs for a stochastic and multiperiod demand model with intertemporal dependencies and a predetermined lag time between the announcement of the tariff and the beginning of the billing period. We established that if the wholesale prices and each customer's consumption are statistically independent, then the optimal two-part tariff is optimal among the class of arbitrary tariffs with the same lag time.
While the optimal two-part tariff mitigates inefficiencies induced by the optimal linear tariff, inequity concerns inconsistent with cost causation arise from the structure of the connection charge. These concerns may become significant with the sparse adoption of behind-the-meter renewables. While tariff design criteria beyond efficiency and revenue adequacy are out of the scope of our work, it is worth mentioning that allowing discriminatory connection charges can give flexibility to the regulator to achieve different objectives (such as inter-customer cost-causation equity) and provide effective long-term signals (e.g., location within the distribution network and investment in on-site generation) [41] .
The study of the efficiency of connection charges presented in this paper represents an initial point of analysis and has limitations that require further investigation. Many interesting questions remain. For example, distribution network congestion and other operational challenges faced by distribution operators should be considered in the tariff design problem, so as to better use prices as a mechanism to allocate scarce resources efficiently. State-contingent benefit induced by q i .
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PROOFS

Proof of Theorem 1
Solving rs(T ) = F in (6) for A and substituting in the objective cs(T ) yields sw(π) − F as in (16) . One can show ∇sw(T ) = E [∇ π D(π, ω)(π − λ)] using Prop. 2 below. The first-order condition (FOC) (7) follows from equating ∇ π sw(T ) = 0. Given π * , (8) follows from the constraint rs(T * ) = F . The strict concavity of sw(T ) (Prop. 4) guarantees the uniqueness and optimality of (A * , π * ). 
Proof: Can be derived using causality of D i and Prop. 1. Proposition 3: For any affine tariff T (q i ) = A + π q i , cs(T ) is strictly convex and (componentwise) decreasing in π.
Proof: Using Prop. 2 one obtains ∇ π cs(T ) = −E[D(π, ω)] and ∇ 2 π cs(T ) = −E[∇ π D(π, ω)]. Since D i (π, ω i ) ≥ 0 componentwise and ∇ π D i (π, ω) is nd, the result follows.
Proposition 4: Consider an affine tariff T (q) = A + π q. If Assumption 1 holds then rs(T ) and the weighted surplus cs(T ) + γrs(T ) are strictly concave in π for any γ ≥ 1.
Proof: Using Prop. 2 one can obtain ∇ 2 π rs(T ) = E[∇ π D(π, ω)] + ∇g(π) and ∇ 2 π (cs(T ) + γrs(T )) = γ∇g(π) + (γ − 1)E[∇ π D(π, ω)]. The result follows since ∇ π D i (π, ω) and ∇g(π) are negative definite (Assumption 1).
Proof of Corollary 1
Uncorrelated ∇ π D(π, ω) and λ implies (7) reduces to π * = λ. Thus, according to (5) , φ(λ) = −Tr (Cov(λ, D(λ, ω) )). The expression for A * follows.
Proof of Corollary 2
Theorem 1 implies that π * is independent of F , and so is sw * = cs(T * )+rs(T * ) since the terms depending on A * cancel out. At optimality, rs(T * ) =F implies cs(T * )= sw * − F .
Proof of Theorem 2
Differentiating the Lagrangian L(π, γ)=cs(T )+γ(rs(T ) − F ) over π yields ∇ π L(π, γ) = E[γ∇ π D(π, ω)(π − λ) + (γ − 1)D(π, ω)].
The FOC in (11) , which implies (12) , follows from equating ∇ π L = 0. The strict concavity of L in π for γ ≥ 1 (Prop. 4) guarantees the uniqueness and optimality of (A † , π † ) for F ≥ φ(π * ). Lastly, the stationarity FOC of max π rs(T ) characterizes π M . Since φ(π M ) ≥ φ(π), ∀π ≥ 0, problem (6) is infeasible if F > φ(π M ).
Proof of Corollary 3
The envelope theorem implies dcs(T † )/dF = −γ, and rs(T † ) = F implies drs(T † )/dF = 1. It follows that dsw(T † )/ dF = 1 − γ, and thus dsw † /dF < 0 for γ > 1. Note that γ = 1 if F = φ(π * ) and that γ increases with F within [φ(π * ), φ(π M )]. Hence, dcs(T † )/dF and dsw(T † )/dF are negative and decreasing in F ∈ [φ(π * ), φ(π M )]. The result follows.
Proof of Theorem 3
One can show that max T (·)
since sw(T ) depends on T only through q i (T, ω i ). Note that ω ⊥ λ implies π * = λ (Cor. 1). Hence, verifying that q i (T * , ω i ) = D i (λ, ω i ) is optimal for problem (17) completes the proof as q i (T * , ω i ) achieves the upper bound in (20) . 
